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Abstract
It is accepted that humans are persons, but what does this mean? Society equates
personhood with legal rights, moral worth, and metaphysical status. But exactly what
makes us persons and distinguishes us from non-persons? What does our conception of
this distinction and the value and rights we grant to persons but not to non-persons say
about the type of creature that we are?
Many philosophers have tried to define metaphysical personhood. However, this
thesis argues that current accounts of metaphysical personhood are inadequate. Next, this
thesis borrows and modifies Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to human dignity
in order to construct a new account of metaphysical personhood. This thesis defines
metaphysical personhood as the existence of seven innate abilities: ability for selfawareness, ability to sense, ability to imagine, ability to think, ability to reason, ability to
feel emotion, and ability to empathize. Each of these abilities must exist to the degree
necessary for its subject to have status dignity. The concepts of innate abilities and status
dignity are defined in the thesis. Finally, this thesis tests this new account of metaphysical
personhood on multiple base and edge cases such as insects, dogs, children, aliens, and
more. Based on these tests, this thesis makes the observation that complex imagination is
the greatest hurdle for metaphysical personhood and is what differentiates humans from
other species on earth.
Finally, this thesis acknowledges that controversial conclusions could arise from
this new account of metaphysical personhood. Especially, under this account, some
humans may not be metaphysical persons at least some of the time. However, this thesis
concludes that moral persons need not be metaphysical persons and that regardless of an
entity’s metaphysical status, we might still owe them moral considerations.
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Introduction
Do fetuses deserve the same protections as adults? At what point does artificial
intelligence become equal to humans? What, if anything, distinguishes us from animals
such as dogs, chimpanzees, and dolphins? This last question might not be as clear cut as
you think. Take the example of a gorilla named Koko. Koko’s IQ is estimated to be
between 70 and 95 which puts her intelligence in the same ballpark as humans. Her
intelligence can be seen in her linguistic capacities; Koko has learned approximately
1,000 signs and can understand approximately 2,000 spoken words. Furthermore, Koko
has been described as creative, capable of telling jokes, and capable of creating new
words by combining old ones (Kind 2015, 1). She has also communicated a full range of
emotions. One notable example is when Koko expressed sorrow after hearing about the
death of Robin Williams, whom she had met and befriended years prior (Coffey 2014).
Koko is clearly a complex specimen, but is she a person?
I will go ahead and assume that all readers of this paper are human beings who
believe that they are persons. Intuitively speaking, our conception of personhood begins
with the idea that we take ourselves to be persons. We define personhood as an entity that
has attained the highest of statuses, a status equal to ourselves. As such, personhood is
associated with increased legal protection, moral worth, and metaphysical value. Each of
these three associations describes a different kind of personhood: legal personhood, moral
personhood, and metaphysical personhood. This thesis, as the title suggests, focuses on
metaphysical personhood. However, before I begin my exploration of metaphysical
personhood, it is beneficial to untangle the differences between these three types of
persons. This will make the objective of metaphysical personhood clearer.
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According to Amy Kind, to be a legal person “is to be the subject of legal rights
and obligations” (Kind 2015, 4). Kind offers the example of the Fourteenth Amendment
which protects a person’s right to life, liberty, and property (Kind 2015, 3-4). While the
determination of legal personhood can pull heavily from the concepts of metaphysical
and moral personhood, in practice its objective is judicial and therefore the scope of legal
personhood is often expanded or retracted in order to fulfill political purposes. For
example, in the past, slaves and women were excluded from legal personhood in order to
restrict their voting rights. On the other hand, many pro-life advocates wish to grant
fetuses full legal personhood in order to abolish abortion. These pro-lifers might not
believe that fetuses have moral or metaphysical personhood but will still define fetuses as
legal persons in order to ban abortion. Since legal personhood is defined by legal
systems, what constitutes a legal person in one country might be different than another.
This is not the case with moral or metaphysical personhood. These kinds of personhood
attempt to define personhood universally through innate features that distinguish persons
from non-persons.
Kind defines moral personhood as an entity that we include “as part of our moral
community and treat […] as deserving of moral consideration” (Kind 2015, 5). Often,
moral personhood is interpreted as synonymous with the right to life. Upon this
perspective, a philosopher attempting to define moral personhood is attempting to
determine which moral qualities in an agent grant that agent its right to life. Another
perspective on moral personhood is to define a moral person as an entity that has moral
status. Mary Anne Warren describes moral status as “a means of specifying those entities
toward which we believe ourselves to have moral obligations, as well as something of
what we take those obligations to be” (Warren 1997, 9). Moral status includes the right to
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life but is also more encompassing. One example of moral status in use would be the
difference in the moral wrongness of kicking a cat or slapping a human. Those that intuit
a greater wrongness in slapping a human over kicking a cat would justify their reasoning
through the human having greater moral status than a cat. The objective in defining moral
personhood, then, is to determine the features of a human that grant humans greater moral
status than a cat.
This brings us to the last account of personhood: metaphysical personhood. Kind
points out a key distinction between accounts of metaphysical personhood versus
accounts of legal or moral personhood. Legal and moral personhood are evaluative.
Ascribing an entity legal personhood grants that entity legal rights and ascribing an entity
moral personhood grants that entity moral status. However, ascribing an entity legal or
moral personhood “does not thereby tell us anything about what kind of thing it is or
what properties it has” (Kind 2015, 12). Metaphysical personhood, on the other hand, is a
descriptive notion. This means that attributing metaphysical personhood to an entity
provides “at least a partial description of it” (Kind 2015, 12). This description allows us
to better understand what distinguishes metaphysical persons from non-persons.
In order to engage with any account of metaphysical personhood we must begin
with the assumption that metaphysical personhood exists. After we accept this premise,
any exploration of metaphysical personhood begins with intuition. This is because the
question of metaphysical personhood stems from our curiosity in determining what
makes us, metaphysically, what we are. Our intuition tells us that fully functioning adult
humans are clearly persons whereas insects are clearly not. But what about Koko, aliens,
robots, artificial intelligence, fetuses, children, and disabled humans? For these, the
answer is not immediate. While our intuitions are powerful and can help with obvious
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base cases, further exploration is needed to make determinations on murky “edge” cases.
For any proposed account of metaphysical personhood to be successful, it must conform
with our intuitions to obvious base cases. For remaining edge cases, a successful theory
of metaphysical personhood should offer strong reasons for why a specific entity is
classified as a person or non-person. This reasoning should abide with, at least somewhat,
our general intuitions regarding metaphysical personhood.
Now that we understand the objective behind metaphysical personhood, we can
look at some existing accounts of metaphysical personhood.

4

Chapter 1: Existing Accounts of Metaphysical Personhood
Many attempts have been made to define metaphysical personhood. One
definition of “person,” endorsed by colloquial language, is a living being with human
genetics or a human body. S. F. Sapontzis points out that this use of the term includes
babies or intellectually and developmentally disabled adults while excluding other
animals such as dogs. This seems strange considering that, as Sapontzis emphasizes, “the
behavior of a normal, adult dog is more organic, intelligent, and self-aware than that of a
human infant or a human adult suffering some severe muscular, neurological, or mental
disorder” (Sapontzis 1981, 608). Under this account of personhood, no matter how
advanced a non-human animal, the animal cannot be a person. On the other hand, no
matter how limited the mental or physical functioning of a human, the human is a person.
From a philosophical perspective, most readers would object to such a contradictory
account of personhood. Fictional worlds such as Star Trek and Narnia have depicted nonhuman and sometimes non-physical entities, such as aliens, animals, robots, or artificial
intelligence, with human qualities. General intuition would indicate that these fictional
beings possess equal metaphysical status to humans and should be granted metaphysical
personhood. Since non-human beings can be persons, we need an account of personhood
that is not dependent on physical bodily attributes.
Some philosophers circumnavigate the physical body dilemma by arguing that
metaphysical and moral personhood are one and the same. They then seek to define
metaphysical personhood through moral status. I disagree with this as moral and
metaphysical personhood, as stated in the introduction, have different objectives: one
being evaluative and the other being descriptive. While moral personhood is interested in
determining what grants an entity full moral status, metaphysical personhood is interested
5

in determining which attributes constitute the nature of persons. It is likely that moral and
metaphysical personhood are closely interconnected, and it is plausible that they are
perfectly correlated. If metaphysical and moral personhood are perfectly correlated, all
metaphysical persons would have full moral status and all entities with full moral status
would be metaphysical persons. However, perfect correlation does not imply sameness.
Let me give an example to demonstrate this. In 2016, the Atlantic wrote an article about
how humans are the only animals with chins. Before you object, the Atlantic defines
“chin” as “a lump of bone that protrudes from the lower jaw” (Yong 2016). Many
animals have a bottom section to their face that looks like a chin, but other than humans
no animal has a bone extending from their lower jaw. This means that “human” and
“organism with a chin” are perfectly correlated concepts, however this does not mean the
two concepts have the same meaning.
Immanuel Kant attempts to avoid the body dilemma by removing the human body
as a requirement for metaphysical personhood. In his book, Critique of Practical Reason,
Kant argues that metaphysical persons are entities with advanced capacities such as
reason, free will, and moral sense (Kant 2015). Kant’s definition of personhood is
complex, and it is difficult to ascertain whether or not he is trying to depict metaphysical
or moral personhood. From my understanding, Kant is attempting to define metaphysical
personhood. However, his definition of metaphysical personhood is perfectly correlated
with moral personhood.
Mary Anne Warren summarizes Kant’s reasoning as to why persons are distinct
from other animals. Persons “are free to act upon the deliverances of reason, rather than
merely from natural causes. Unlike other animals, we are not motivated solely by
emotion, instinct, and other non-rational forces. Because we can neither doubt our
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freedom, nor find room for it in the natural world, we must locate it within the realm of
things in themselves, where causal laws do not apply” (Warren 1997, 100). We humans,
according to Kant, are persons because of our ability to reason. Kant believes that reason
breaks the cycle of instinctual cause and effect that restricts lesser animals and allows us
to determine right from wrong. Most importantly, Kant believes the freedom we obtain
from reason grants us moral agency as we can be held responsible for acting in
accordance with or against our moral obligations. This moral agency, according to Kant,
is what distinguishes metaphysical persons from non-persons. Moral agency is also what
Kant believes grants an entity full moral status, making Kant’s metaphysical personhood
seemingly perfectly correlated with moral personhood.
The issue with Kant’s construction of personhood is moral agency. In order for an
agent to be morally responsible for its actions it must have free will. On this, Kant and I
agree. The problem with free will is that free will and determinism are exclusive. One
cannot exist with the other. Should this world operate deterministically, all agents would
have no free will. For any action there would have been no possibility to act otherwise.
Kant claims that the ability to reason grants persons free will. However, in a deterministic
world, reason would be a function of chemistry, biology, and physics. Determinists argue
that our genetics, environment, and past experiences determine the neurological pathways
within our brains. These neurological pathways, when activated by internal or external
stimuli, dictate our reasoning. This means that our reasoning is predetermined by factors
outside of ourselves and therefore free will cannot exist. If free will does not exist, no
agent could be morally responsible for their actions. We cannot hold someone
responsible for an action if they could not have done otherwise.

7

Some compatibilists would argue that it is possible to have moral agency in a
deterministic world. The most famous of these arguments is made by Harry Frankfurt. He
rejects the premise that moral agency requires the possibility to have done otherwise. In
his paper, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Frankfurt offers an example
where he believes an agent could not have done otherwise but still has moral
responsibility. His example, summarized by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
can be roughly paraphrased as follows. Suppose Jones wishes to shoot Smith. A third
actor, Black, wants Smith dead and therefore wants Jones to shoot Smith. Black is
worried that Jones will waver in his determination to shoot Smith and so Black takes
necessary precautions. He utilizes hypnosis and the insertion of a mind-altering chip to
ensure that should Jones waver, Black can force Jones to shoot Smith. Suppose that Jones
carries out his plan without wavering. He shoots Smith without the need of any
intervention from Black. In this example, Jones had no alternative option. Had Jones
wavered, he would have been manipulated by Black and would have still shot Smith.
However, Frankfurt argues that, despite his lack of choice, Jones is morally responsible
for shooting Smith because he shot Smith out of his own volition. Therefore, Frankfurt
believes you can be held morally responsible even if you could not have done otherwise
(McKenna and Coates 2019).
The issue with Frankfurt’s account of compatibilism is that it mistakes
determinism with the idea that one could not have done otherwise. According to
Frankfurt, despite the fact that he had no alternative options, Jones’s volition to shoot
Smith stems from his free will. We can then hold Jones morally accountable for his
volition. Frankfurt believes he has given an account of free will in a deterministic world.
However, if our world is deterministic, Jones deciding to shoot Smith out of his own
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volition, rather than due to Black’s manipulation, was predetermined by his genetics,
environment, and experiences. Therefore, Jones volition is not rooted in free will and we
cannot hold him morally responsible for having that volition.
There is heavy debate in the philosophical community on the reality of
determinism. Kant, who believes in the possibility of free will, might argue that his
account of metaphysical personhood is valid. However, Kant’s account of determinism is
dependent on the falsity of determinism. The issue with this is that the reality of
determinism should be irrelevant to metaphysical personhood. Should we discover the
world is deterministic, the idea of metaphysical personhood should not cease to exist.
Even in a deterministic world, there are notable metaphysical differences between an
insect and a human. These metaphysical differences indicate that there exists a line that
separates persons from non-persons. Remember, metaphysical personhood is universal
and should explain all instances of personhood: in deterministic and nondeterministic
worlds. Therefore, any sound account of metaphysical personhood cannot be dependent
on free will. Because Kant’s account of metaphysical personhood is dependent on free
will, his account is at best identifying confounding variables for personhood.
Now that we have determined determinism cannot be a barrier for metaphysical
personhood, we must explore other accounts of personhood. John Locke and Harry
Frankfurt offer two possible accounts of metaphysical personhood that are independent of
determinism and free will.
Locke defines a person as a “thinking intelligent being, that has reason and
reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and
places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking”
(Locke 1690, 211). Locke’s account of personhood shares some similarities with Kant’s.
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Both believe that the capabilities of intelligence and reason are necessary for personhood.
However, Locke differs with Kant in that he adds consciousness and removes moral
agency as necessary criteria of personhood. While this solves for the issue of
determinism, Locke’s definition is not sufficient. Modern research and case studies have
provided evidence that many non-human organisms have capacities for intelligence,
reason, and consciousness. In fact, a paper written by Andrew Barron and Colin Klein
suggests that insects’ “capacity for selective attention supports [the] assertion that insects
have a capacity for subjective experience” (Barron and Klein 2016, 4905). This means
that insects have consciousness.
Furthermore, a recent study conducted in the University of Michigan provides
evidence that paper wasps exhibit behavior that resembles logical reasoning. This study,
conducted by Elizabeth Tibbets, shows that paper wasps are capable of transitive
inference, a type of logic. Transitive inference is a form of deductive reasoning which
utilizes the transitive property. One example of transitive inference is concluding that if A
> B and B > C then A > C. In her study, Tibbets tested whether wasps could create a
hierarchy of colors. To do this, she exposed paper wasps to several bicolored chambers.
In each chamber, when the wasp moved towards the “inferior” color, the wasp would be
shocked. For the other color, no shock would be administered. For example, in a chamber
with the colors blue and green, the wasp would be shocked when moving towards green
but not when moving towards blue. This teaches the wasp that blue is “better” than green.
Tibbets repeated this across multiple chambers with different color combinations to see if
wasps could develop a color hierarchy using transitive inference. For example, if a wasp
learned that blue is better than green, and that yellow is better than blue, then the wasp
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would know that yellow is better than green. Surprisingly, wasps moved in the direction
of the favorable color around 67% of the time (Tibbetts et al. 2019).
Under Locke’s account of personhood, paper wasps are persons. However, this
contradicts intuition and for good reason. There are many notable differences between
humans and paper wasps. While paper wasps may meet Locke’s requirements of
intelligence, reason, and consciousness, humans have a higher aptitude for all of these
abilities. Locke’s barebones definition of metaphysical personhood places no minimum
threshold for the extent of the abilities he requires for personhood. This results in an
account of metaphysical personhood that is far too encompassing.
Frankfurt’s definition of metaphysical personhood is the last account I will
consider. He comes closest to successfully defining metaphysical personhood as he is
immune to the issue of determinism and the issue of minimum thresholds that exclude
insects from personhood. In his paper, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a
Person,” Frankfurt defines personhood as the possession of second order volitions. The
concept of second order volitions is incomprehensible without first understanding first
and second order desires. According to Frankfurt, first order desires are “simply desires
to do or not to do one thing or another” (Frankfurt 1971, 7). For example, if I am hungry
and sit next to a cupcake, I will have the first order desire to want to eat that cupcake.
According to Frankfurt, all animals have first order desires. However, not all animals
have second order desires. A second order desire is a desire to have a desire. Going back
to the aforementioned example, I might not want to have the desire to eat a cupcake. I
might want to have a desire to eat a healthier snack. Not all second order desires move us
to action. There are instances where we have second order desires but do not want those
second order desires to influence our decisions. This might seem counterintuitive, but
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Frankfurt offers an example of such an instance. Suppose a psychotherapist specializes
with drug addicts. This psychotherapist believes that his ability to treat and
psychologically analyze his patients would be improved if he understood their urge to
abuse drugs. He therefore has a desire to desire drugs. However, the psychotherapist is
fully aware of the danger of drugs and so while he has this desire to desire drugs, he does
not want this second order desire to push him to abuse drugs (Frankfurt 1971, 9). When
an entity has a second order desire that it wishes to be its will, Frankfurt considers this
entity to be a person. Frankfurt calls these types of second order desires second order
volitions. Entities that have second order desires but are incapable of second order
volitions are what Frankfurt calls wantons, which is a status above basic animals but
below persons. A wanton does not concern itself with the question of its will. This does
not mean that a wanton has no rational abilities. It is possible for a wanton to use reason
to deliberate and determine the best means of acting upon its desire. However, a wanton
does not care which of its first order desires is the desire that move it to action.
To illustrate the difference between a wanton and a person, Frankfurt offers the
example of two addicts. Both addicts are physically incapable of resisting their
addictions. However, the first addict wishes he was not addicted to drugs. He wishes that
his desire towards a healthy lifestyle was the desire that motivated his actions. However,
against his wishes, it is ultimately his physical desire for drugs that moves him to action.
This addict is what Frankfurt calls the unwilling addict. The unwilling addict exhibits a
second order volition. He wants his desire to not abuse drugs to be his will. He is
therefore, according to Frankfurt, a person. The other addict does not care whether or not
his addiction motivates his actions. This second addict might have multiple first order
desires, one of which is to not abuse drugs. However, he has no preference as to which
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first order desire motivates his actions. Rather, he submits to the strongest of his first
order desires and never considers which first order desire he would like to be his will.
This second addict is a wanton as he does not have any second order volitions (Frankfurt
1971, 12-13).
Frankfurt’s account of personhood is independent of determinism. Second order
volitions can exist due to deterministic causes or free will. His account is also not
susceptible to the paper wasp problem faced by Locke. Frankfurt’s definition excludes
most animals, and especially insects, from personhood as these organisms are incapable
of second order volitions. Despite this, Frankfurt’s account is still lacking. His sole
requirement of personhood is second order volitions. This implies that an entity with
second order volitions, but without thought or reason, is a person. Frankfurt believes such
an entity is impossible. I disagree. It is entirely conceivable for an entity to have first
order desires, second order desires, and second order volitions without any ability for
thought and reason.
Take, for example, an alien species that operates in a hive-like society revolving
around a queen. The queen is complex. She is capable of thought and reason. However,
each of the non-queen entities, which we shall call minions, of this species have no
ability to think or reason. They do have base instincts which drive their first order desires.
In this alien society, the queen has the ability to influence her minions via telekinesis.
This influence acts as the minions’ second order desires and second order volitions. For
example, assume the minions have a first order desire to eat yogurt. Let’s say that on a
particular day, the queen is craving yogurt. Due to limited stores of yogurt, the queen
uses telekinesis to influence her minions to have the second order desire to desire not to
eat yogurt. Furthermore, she is capable of influencing the minions in such a way that

13

these minions wish this second order desire was their will. These minions are then
capable of second order volitions. Consequently, according to Frankfurt, minions are
persons. This seems erroneous. It makes sense to assume the queen is a metaphysical
person, but to ascribe the same metaphysical status to minions just feels wrong. The
minions are incapable of thinking for themselves and simply desire what they are told to
desire. This makes minions closer to machines than us. The ability to think and reason are
integral to what gives us metaphysical value and should be criteria for metaphysical
personhood. In this regard, like Locke’s account of personhood, Frankfurt’s account of
personhood is too lenient.
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Chapter 2: The Capabilities Approach for Metaphysical Personhood
Locke’s and Frankfurt’s accounts of metaphysical personhood offer good starting
points for thinking about what constitutes metaphysical personhood, but both accounts
are insufficient. They both introduce important abilities and functions that are important
for personhood but neither account provides a list of criteria that effectively weeds out all
non-persons. The question then becomes how do we find such a list?
I believe to answer this question we must look to the dignity of persons. Before I
continue, it is important to understand what dignity is. Paul Formosa and Catriona
Mackenzie define dignity as follows: “x has dignity if and only if x has a respect-worthy
status. […] A status is respect-worthy if it is a weighty and important status to which we
should respond with (something like) awe or reverence” (Formosa and Mackenzie 2014,
877). Formosa and Mackenzie outline two types of dignity that persons possess:
achievement dignity and status dignity. However, there is a third type of dignity, species
dignity, that the two philosophers overlooked. Martha Nussbaum explores this type of
dignity, as it relates to humans, through what she calls the Capabilities Approach to
Human Development.
According to Formosa and Mackenzie, achievement dignity is tiered and
temporary. It can be gained or lost based on present achievements or states of being. For
example, I gain achievement dignity when I act virtuously and tutor children at my local
orphanage. I lose achievement dignity when I act dishonorably and lie for my own
advantage (Formosa and Mackenzie 2014, 880).
Species dignity is an Aristotelian concept and relates to the dignity that stems
from the capabilities that define what it means for a specific species to flourish. A
capability is to be capable of doing a particular action. While a species might have many
15

capabilities, only a handful define what it means to be a member of that species. Let us
call these capabilities the flourishing-capabilities. Nussbaum believes flourishingcapabilities are respect-worthy qualities and that the restriction of any of these
flourishing-capabilities is an affront to a species’ dignity. Therefore, to have species
dignity is to have all of the capabilities that are flourishing-capabilities for a particular
species. For example, for pigeons, flying is essential to what it means to be a pigeon.
Should a pigeon be locked in a cage and restricted from flying, we would consider that to
be an offense to the pigeon. Therefore, flying is a flourishing-capability for pigeons and
constitutes a part of a pigeon’s species dignity. This is a quick summary of species
dignity and the role Nussbaum believes capabilities play in regard to species dignity. In
reality, Nussbaum defines three kinds of capabilities, each of which plays a part in
species dignity. I will dive deeper into species dignity, specifically the species dignity of
humans, and explain the concept of capabilities in greater detail later in this chapter.
Finally, status dignity is binary. You either have it or you don’t. Status dignity
“refers to the respect-worthy status of a person him or herself” (Formosa and Mackenzie
2014, 877). Status dignity is closely related to species dignity. If an organism has all the
necessary capabilities necessary for personhood, that organism has status dignity. To
have status dignity is what it means to be a person. This means that all capabilities
necessary for status dignity are flourishing-capabilities for persons. This also means that,
by definition, all persons have status dignity and all entities with status dignity are
persons. However, while all persons have status dignity, it is possible for persons to have
additional species-specific flourishing-capabilities.
But which capabilities are necessary for status dignity? To find out, we can look
to the species dignity of humans, otherwise known as human dignity, since we know that
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humans are persons. Because humans are persons, the capabilities that define human
dignity include all the necessary capabilities for status dignity along with other human
specific capabilities. I have created a visual representation in the following figure.

If we filter out all the other human specific capabilities, which are capabilities that
seem to be specific to humans but irrelevant for personhood, we are left with the
capabilities necessary for status dignity and thus metaphysical personhood.
Martha Nussbaum is renowned for her exploration of human dignity in her book
Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach. To determine which
capabilities are flourishing-capabilities for humans, Nussbaum provides the case study of
an Indian woman named Vasanti whose capabilities are at first restricted but then later
allowed to prosper. When Vasanti’s story begins, she is married to a husband who does
not respect her and who regularly abuses her. In addition to suffering from domestic
violence, Vasanti is forcefully cut off from her family, friends, and community. She is not
allowed to work and is incapable of engaging in politics due to a lack of education and a
forced seclusion that has left her illiterate and oblivious to current events. Her domestic
problems are compounded due to the fact that her husband is an alcoholic gambler. In
order to earn some quick cash, Vasanti’s husband takes advantage of a government

17

program seeking to curb population growth by offering monetary incentives for men who
undergo vasectomies. The vasectomy proves disastrous for Vasanti as it makes it
impossible for Vasanti to bear children with her husband. With no possibility for children
in the future and no existing children in need of care, Vasanti’s perceived usefulness in
the eyes of her husband is diminished resulting in an escalation of domestic abuse.
Unhappy with her life, Vasanti leaves her husband and returns home.
At home, Vasanti’s life takes an upwards turn. Her father passed away years prior
but fortunately her brothers are there to take care of her. They run an auto parts shop and
allow Vasanti to use one of the machines to start her own business. She uses the machine
to make components for sarees. With some financial support from her brothers as well as
a local nonprofit organization, Vasanti is able to take out a loan to buy more machines
and expand her business. Inspired by her newfound confidence and hoping to improve the
lives of others like herself, Vasanti begins volunteering to combat domestic abuse in her
local community. While volunteering, Vasanti begins to make meaningful friendships
with like-minded women. By the time Nussbaum meets Vasanti, Vasanti has plans to
enroll in educational programs that will teach her how to read, write, plan her personal
finances, and be politically involved (Nussbaum 2011).
After Nussbaum completes her story, she asks her readers to focus on the aspects
of Vasanti’s narrative that stand out. To most readers these themes include: domestic
abuse, education, companionship, financial independence, and self-confidence. These
themes stand out because we believe they are related to what Vasanti has the power to do
and be (her capabilities) and they have a profound impact on her sense of self-worth and
her human flourishing. We feel empathy for Vasanti when we hear her capabilities to
form friendships, work, and live at home safely are restricted by her husband. When we

18

learn that Vasanti eventually leaves her husband, giving her access to capabilities she
previously lacked, we assume her quality of life improved.
Based off this case study, Nussbaum has made it evident that there are certain
capabilities that are central for human life. Before diving into the list of capabilities
necessary for human dignity, we must first understand Nussbaum’s three sub
classifications of capabilities: innate abilities, internal capabilities, and combined
capabilities.
Innate abilities are the traits we are born with. For example, Vasanti was born
with the innate ability to see. Internal capabilities are “trained or developed traits and
abilities, developed, in most cases, in interaction with social, economic, familial, and
political involvement” (Nussbaum 2011, 21). While Vasanti might have been born with
the ability to see, she was not born with the ability to read. She might be able to
distinguish different letters from each other, but without any education, she would be
illiterate. However, with the help of some schooling, over time, she can become a skilled
and quick reader. Any development of internal capabilities is useless without the freedom
and resources to express them. Even if Vasanti learns how to read, this skill would be
useless if she is restricted from books, newspapers, and the internet. This brings
Nussbaum to her concept of combined capabilities. A combined capability is the
alignment of an internal capability and the external conditions that grant the freedom for
the ability to manifest itself. Going back to the reading example, Vasanti would have the
combined capability to read if she had learned how to read and had access to meaningful
reading material. On the other hand, no matter her external circumstances, Vasanti would
never have the innate ability nor would it be possible for her to develop the internal
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capability to jump twenty feet in the air. Consequently, she would never have the
combined capability to jump that high.
Capabilities are not to be confused with functioning. A functioning is a state of
being. Take the comparison of a person who is fasting and a person who is starving. Both
people have the exact same functioning in regard to nutrition. They are both facing a
caloric deficit. However, the fasting individual is doing so by choice. They have the
capability to fast or not fast. On the other hand, the starving individual has no such
capability.
With an understanding of these sub-classifications of capabilities, we can now
engage with Nussbaum’s construction of human dignity. Nussbaum defines human
dignity by the ways it can be violated. Human dignity can be violated in one of two ways.
The first manner it can be violated is when “social, political, familial, and economic
conditions […] prevent people from choosing to function in accordance with a developed
internal capability: this sort of thwarting is comparable to imprisonment” (Nussbaum
2011, 30-31). The other manner in which dignity is violated is when, due to poor
conditions, the development of internal capabilities is stunted (Nussbaum 2011, 31).
Clearly not all internal and combined capabilities are necessary for dignity. For
example, when Vasanti’s husband restricts her from making friends, we consider that to
be an affront to her dignity. However, if her husband restricts her from crowing like a
rooster, we would not consider her dignity to be similarly offended. According to
Nussbaum, there are ten central capabilities that are necessary for human flourishing and
therefore must be protected to respect human dignity. Here is Nussbaum’s presentation of
these capabilities.
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Capability

Nussbaum’s Exact Description (Nussbaum 2011, 33-34)

Life

Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not
dying prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not
worth living.

Bodily Health

Being able to have a good health, including reproductive health; to
be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.

Bodily Integrity

Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against
violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence;
having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters
of reproduction.

Senses,

Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think and reason-and to do

Imagination,

these things in a “truly human” way, a way informed and cultivated

and Thought

by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to,
literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to
use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and
producing works and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary,
musical, and so forth. Being able to use one’s own mind in ways
protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to
both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise.
Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid
nonbeneficial pain.

Emotions

Being able to have attachments to things and people outside
ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their
absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing,
gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional
development blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this
capability means supporting forms of human association that can be
shown to be crucial in their development.)

Practical

Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical

Reason

reflection about the planning of one’s life. (This entails protections
for the liberty of conscience and religious observance.)
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Capability

Nussbaum’s Exact Description (Nussbaum 2011, 33-34)

Affiliation

(A) Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and
show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of
social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another.
(B) Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation;
being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to
that of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination on the
basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion,
national origin.

Other Species

Being able to live with concern for and in relation to other animals,
plants, and the world of nature.

Play

Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.

Control over

(A) Political. Being able to participate effectively in political

Environment

choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political
participation, protections of free speech and association.
(B) Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable
goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others;
having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others;
having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work,
being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and
entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with
other workers.

The above table of capabilities and the descriptions for them is specific to human
dignity and not status dignity. To modify the table to suit status dignity we must remove
some capabilities and modify the remaining to remove any excess qualities that are
specific to what humans are but not necessarily what our intuitions towards persons are.
In chapter 1, we entertained the idea of robots and artificial intelligence being
persons. Since these entities are not “alive” and do not always have bodies, we can
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remove the capabilities of life, bodily health, and bodily integrity as those are dependent
on life and bodies. We must also remove or modify any capabilities that reference human
culture or politics. This is because not all species share our culture or politics, however,
they might still be complex enough in their capabilities to be persons. With this in mind,
we can immediately remove the capability for “control over one’s environment” as it is
entirely related to human culture and politics. To modify the remaining six capabilities,
we must remove all references to race, gender, religion, property ownership, politics, etc.
These attributes, while playing a large role in human life, might not be relevant to other
advanced species that could be persons. After modifying Nussbaum’s capabilities, we are
left with a table of internal and combined capabilities that must be protected in order to
respect a person’s status dignity. This table can be seen on the next page.
Before examining the modified table, keep in mind that all persons have status
dignity. This means that for an entity to be a person, the entity should have the potential
to develop, under the right circumstances, the following internal and combined
capabilities. If, for whatever reason, these capabilities are not allowed to develop or
manifest themselves, the entity still has status dignity and thus personhood, however, the
entity’s status dignity has been disrespected.
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Capability

Modified Description of Nussbaum’s Capabilities
(Nussbaum 2011, 33-34)

Senses,

Being able to use senses to imagine, think, and reason at a high

Imagination,

capacity. A person is able to use imagination, thought, and reason to

Thought, and

make critical judgements about itself, what is best for itself, and to

Reason

form a conception of the good while critically reflecting on it. In
addition to having a conception of the “good,” a person must be able
to act in accordance with this conception rather than succumb to
instinct and basic desire. A person must be able to use imagination
and reason to form second order volitions. In other words, a person
must be able to imagine several variants of itself under different first
order desires and use reason to determine which variant it would like
to embody. Furthermore, a person should be able to produce selfexpressive works. Finally, a person should be able to have
pleasurable experiences and be able to avoid unnecessary pain.
This capability has been heavily modified from Nussbaum’s original
presentation. Nussbaum treats “Practical Reason” as a separate
capability. I believe senses, imagination, thought, and reason are
used simultaneously and should be one capability. Nussbaum states
that senses, imagination, and thought must exist in a “truly human
way.” For this modified capability, I expand upon what that means. I
also remove references to human culture such as religion.

Emotions

Being able to have attachments to things and people outside
ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their
absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing,
gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional
development blighted by fear and anxiety.
This capability remains exactly the same as Nussbaum’s original
presentation.
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Capability

Modified Description of Nussbaum’s Capabilities
(Nussbaum 2011, 33-34)

Affiliation

A) Being able to live with and show concern for others, empathize
with (and show compassion for) others and the capability of justice
and friendship. (B) Being able to have self-respect and not be
humiliated, that is, being treated with dignity and equal worth.
This capability is a modified version of Nussbaum’s original
presentation. Nussbaum’s originally included references to humanity
and human specific attributes such as race, gender, religion etc. This
capability was modified to remove all references of those human
specific attributes.

Other Species

Being able to live with concern for and in relation to other animals,
plants, and the world of nature.
This capability remains exactly the same as Nussbaum’s original
presentation.

Play

Being able to play and to enjoy recreational activities.
This capability is a slightly modified version of Nussbaum’s original
presentation. Nussbaum includes laughter in this capability. It is
possible that some advanced organism is as advanced as a human
but unable to laugh due to biological limitations. Therefore, the only
change to this capability is the exclusion of laughter.

These five capabilities are associated with status dignity and hence metaphysical
personhood. Remember, if an entity has status dignity then the restriction of any of these
combined capabilities or the suppression of the development of any of these internal
capabilities is a wrongdoing on that entity. This means that a creature has status dignity
and therefore personhood if the creature has all the innate abilities to the degree necessary
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for all of the above capabilities to be within the potential for that creature. The creature
need not have the internal or combined capabilities but only have the potential to develop
them. Therefore, when testing for personhood, we must test for the innate abilities and
the strength of those abilities rather than checking if the creature has demonstrated
examples of the capabilities themselves. This is because it is possible that a creature has
the innate abilities necessary for these capabilities but due to external circumstances were
never able to develop the internal or combined capabilities listed above. In such an
instance, the creature still has its status dignity and thus personhood. However, the
creature’s status dignity has been disrespected. With this in mind, the list of innate
abilities that define metaphysical humanity is outlined in the following table.
Capability

Prerequisite Innate Abilities

Senses, Imagination, Thought, and

Ability for self-awareness

Reason

Ability to sense
Ability to imagine
Ability to think
Ability to reason

Emotions

Ability to feel emotions

Affiliation

Ability to empathize (the ability to empathize
requires the prerequisites abilities to feel
emotions to imagine oneself as another)

Other Species

Ability to empathize

Play

Ability to sense
Ability to imagine
Ability to think
Ability to reason
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In summary, to achieve metaphysical personhood, an entity must have the
following innate abilities: ability for self-awareness, ability to sense, ability to imagine,
ability to think, ability to reason, ability to feel emotion, and ability to empathize.
Furthermore, these innate abilities must be complex enough for the owner of these
abilities to have the potential for all five internal and combined capabilities needed for
status dignity. Now, all that is left is to test this new account of personhood.
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Chapter 3: Testing the New Account of Metaphysical Personhood
To check if this new capability approach to personhood is viable, we must see
how it classifies obvious cases such as humans and insects. If this new account of
personhood is successful it should, at the very least, classify humans as persons and
insects as non-persons. If this new approach is successful for the basic cases, we can
continue to test it on more difficult cases such as dogs, chimpanzees, and dolphins. For
this account of personhood to be superior to the accounts listed in chapter 1, it must also
effectively handle the problems and counterexamples addressed in chapter 1. This means
the capabilities approach to personhood must be independent of determinism, must
classify paper wasps as non-persons, and must classify the minions from the hive mind
example as non-persons. If the capabilities account of personhood can pass these tests,
then we can continue to test this account of personhood with more complicated edge
cases such as Koko the gorilla, children, disabled humans, advanced aliens, and advanced
artificial intelligence. Based on the results of these complicated cases, we can learn more
about what it means to be a metaphysical person.
I previously mentioned that in regard to personhood it is the existence of innate
abilities rather than internal and combined capabilities that define personhood. The
reason being that it is entirely possible that a creature has the relevant innate abilities to
have certain internal and combined capabilities but due to environmental circumstances
was never able to develop those capabilities. However, for the purposes of the following
tests, I will assume that if no creature of a particular species has ever shown a particular
internal or combined capability then that species likely does not possess the innate
abilities to the degree necessary to develop those capabilities. This is by no means a
guaranteed assumption, but it is a necessary one to proceed with practical testing.
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Let us start with humans. We know that humans meet the requirements for
personhood because the requirements for status dignity are simplified versions of the
requirements for human dignity. Now we can move onto insects. In chapter 1, we
determined that insects are capable of self-awareness and some insects, like paper wasps,
are able to reason. This proved to be problematic for Locke as his account of personhood
results in paper wasps being persons. However, under the capabilities approach to
metaphysical personhood, there are additional requirements for personhood. Even if
wasps are capable of basic logic, this does not mean that wasps possess the ability to
reason to the degree necessary for metaphysical personhood.
Under the capabilities approach, in order for a wasp’s innate ability for reason to
meet the threshold for personhood, they must be able to use reason to form a conception
of “good.” Furthermore, a wasp should be able to act on reason even if its reason
contradicts with its instincts and immediate desires. In the case of humans, this can be
seen when we choose to forego unhealthy snacks for our long-term health. In that
instance, we are using reason to override an immediate instinctual desire. We do not
know if wasps have the ability to reason to the degree necessary for personhood. In the
case of the color experiment, we know that wasps will go towards a favorable color
because they want to avoid being shocked. This shows they have the ability to use reason
to act in accordance with immediate desires. Currently, we have no evidence that wasps
are capable of creating a conception of “good” or are capable of using reason to override
immediate desires.
But even if paper wasps do have the innate ability for reason powerful enough to
count towards personhood, they still do not meet other requirements for personhood. One
of the abilities wasps are lacking is the ability to feel emotions. According to Timothy
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Gibb, an Entomologist at Purdue University, “most entomologists agree that insects do
not feel emotion – at least, not in the same way that humans do. Their brains are too
simple, missing the key parts associated with emotion in human brains. There may be
some level of awareness in insect consciousness but not to the extent of feeling attraction,
or empathy or happiness or sadness or even the ability to feel joy or pain” (Gibb, Purdue).
So far, the capabilities approach to personhood has effectively classified humans
as persons and has classified insects, including the more advanced wasps, as non-persons.
This means this new approach, at the very least, improves upon Locke’s account of
personhood. But does it solve for the issues faced by Kant and Frankfurt? Remember that
Kant ran into the problem of determinism. If determinism were real, his version of
metaphysical personhood ceases to exist. This is not an issue for the capabilities approach
to personhood. No aspect of self-awareness, sense, imagination, thought, reason,
emotion, or empathy are predicated on free will or determinism. Therefore, all seven
necessary innate abilities required for personhood can exist in both a free and a
deterministic world.
Next, let us consider the counterexample to Frankfurt’s account of personhood,
the case of the hive minded minions. In this counterexample, hive minded minions have
second order volitions imposed upon them by their queen, however they do not have the
innate ability to reason. Since minions are incapable of reason, according to the
capabilities approach to personhood, they are not persons. Because this new account
successfully classifies minions as non-persons, this new account of personhood improves
upon Frankfurt’s account of personhood.
Now we can move onto more complex animals such as dogs, chimpanzees, and
dolphins. To determine if these animals are persons, we must test to see if they have all
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the necessary innate abilities for personhood. The first two abilities, self-awareness and
sensation, are obvious and do not need further explanation. All three animals clearly have
a sense of self awareness and are capable of processing sensory inputs.
All three animals also have the innate ability of emotion. Any dog owner can tell
you that their dog has a full range of emotions including but not limited to: anger,
happiness, sadness, and love. Meanwhile, chimpanzees have been shown to mourn death.
Researchers James Anderson, Alasdair Gillies, and Louise Lock studied a group of
chimpanzees in Scotland and noticed that the chimpanzees supported an elderly female
prior to her death. Following the death of their companion, the chimpanzees remained
somber and avoided the site of their friend’s death. (Anderson, Gillies, and Lock 2010).
Dolphins are also known to feel emotion. A quick Google or Youtube search will show
many instances of dolphins acting happy or sad. In addition, heartbreaking photo
evidence from the Evening Standard shows a grieving dolphin carrying her dead calf for
days after its death (Tobin 2019). Furthermore, many dolphins show signs of depression
and other negative psycho-physiological effects when forced into captivity. This mental
stress often results in the premature death of these dolphins (Carter 1982, 194-195). All
three animals clearly have the innate ability to feel emotion and these emotions are
complex enough to demonstrate the capability of emotion needed for status dignity.
These three animals also have strong abilities for empathy. Dogs are known to
comfort their owners during times of trauma. Dogs are also known to put their lives at
risk to save their human companions. One example, reported by CNN, is when a dog
named Curly risked its life to wake up its owner during a house fire (Maxouris 2019).
Meanwhile, chimpanzees often share resources, which suggest chimpanzees feel empathy
for their fellow chimps (Silk et al. 2013). Lastly, anecdotal evidence suggests that
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dolphins are able to understand and sympathize with the plights of others. One example,
from scientist Maddalena Bearzi and reported on by Elizabeth Day of The Guardian, tells
the story of a group of dolphins who led scientists to the floating body of a girl who
attempted to kill herself (Day 2015). Another example of dolphins using empathy comes
from a video taken at Kyum Park in South Korea. In this video, a group of dolphins are
flocking to help an injured companion who was incapable of swimming on her own. The
uninjured dolphins dove below the water, creating an impromptu raft to carry the injured
dolphin to safety (Marshall 2013). These animals not only have the ability for empathy
but clearly possess the two capabilities that come with empathy, “affiliation” and “other
species,” as all three animals have shown that they can affiliate with their own species as
well as members of other species.
The final abilities in question are the ability to imagine, ability to think, and
ability to reason. There is strong evidence suggesting that all three animals have some
degree of imagination, thinking, and reasoning. For example, according to Marc Bekoff,
a professor of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology at the University of Colorado, dogs
often “chase their tails and bite them as if the tail was prey or a competitor” (Bekoff
1998). This pretend play suggests dogs have some imaginative capacity as pretend play is
impossible without imagination. Chimpanzees are also known to pretend play. A
chimpanzee named Viki has been seen pulling an imaginary pull toy, pretending her
imaginary toy was stuck, and imitating humans reading newspapers (Gomez and MartinAndrade 2005, 151). For dolphins, researchers have found evidence that calves
continuously produce new and innovative play. They will play with anything they happen
to come across, from plastic to dead animals in the water. Young dolphins also make
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their own “toys”, playing with bubbles that they produce. (Kuczaj and Eskelinen 2014).
This ability would also be impossible without imagination.
Finally, all three animals have proven capable of thinking and reasoning.
Chimpanzees are able to deduce the locations of other chimpanzees based off stimuli
such as moving branches (Volter 2017). Additionally, Researchers have found that
dolphins use reason to solve puzzles and plan ahead. One study, conducted by Stan
Kuczaj, Mark Xitco, and John Gory tested dolphins’ problem-solving abilities. They
constructed a puzzle that required dolphins to push four weights on-top of a cube in order
to release fish. In some trials, the weights were placed far from the cube. In other trials,
the weights were placed close to the cube. The dolphins tested were not only able to solve
this puzzle but were able to find efficient solutions to their problems. In the trials where
the weights were far away, the dolphins carried multiple weights at once to save time. In
trials where the weights were close to the cube, the dolphins only carried one weight at a
time to conserve energy (Kuczak, Gory, and Xitco 2009). This shows that dolphins are
able to use reason to find the most efficient solutions to novel problems. Finally, dogs
have done well in tests of inferential reasoning. Inferential reasoning is the ability to
determine that A or B, not A, therefore B. For example, my dog has been able to deduce
that if I hide a treat in one of two containers, and I show her that one of the containers is
empty, then the treat must exist in the other container.
The important question is whether dogs, chimpanzees, and dolphins have these
abilities to the level that they have potential for the following capabilities: “play” and
“senses, imagination, thought, and reason.” I have already referenced examples of all
three animals playing: dogs playing with their tails, chimpanzees playing with imaginary
toys, and dolphins playing with bubbles. All that is left to check is whether these animals
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have the potential to develop or already have the capability of “senses, imagination,
thought, and reason.” More specifically, we must check if these animals are capable of
forming a conception of good, acting on reason over base instinct and immediate desires,
and forming second order volitions. All three animals have shown an ability to form a
conception of good. I have given examples of all three animals acting with empathy in
the best interest of others: the dog saving its owner from a fire, chimpanzees sharing
resources, and a group of dolphins helping their injured drowning friend. In addition,
studies have shown that dogs and chimpanzees have an understanding of equality and
refuse to partake in activities where they are rewarded less than their peers when
completing the same task (Emory University 2014). This shows dogs and chimpanzees
understand that inequality is bad.
All three animals are also able to act in accordance with reason over instinct and
immediate desire. This is evident as all three animals have passed delayed gratification
tests. In one study, dolphins were trained to remove trash from their tanks and exchange
them for treats. One dolphin kept a stash of trash in reserve, rather than immediately
exchanging it for treats, so that on days when his tank was clean, he could pull from his
savings of trash to obtain treats (Anderson 2019, 54). Chimpanzees have also done well
in tests of delayed gratification. A study conducted by Michael J. Beran and Theodore A.
Evans showed that chimpanzees are willing to accept tokens for more preferable food in
the future rather than accepting less preferable food in the present (Beran and Evans
2013). My own dog, a six-month-old miniature Australian Shephard, is capable of
abiding by her “leave it” command by sitting in front of her treats for several minutes
before consuming it. This exhibit of self-control shows that many dogs are capable of
delayed gratification.
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The last requirement for dogs, chimpanzees, and dolphins to be deemed
metaphysical persons is second order volitions. Due to an inability to effectively
communicate with any of these creatures it is difficult to ascertain whether these
creatures are capable of forming second order volitions. However, there are proxies we
can use to make judgements regarding second order volitions. In order to have a second
order volition, it is necessary to use imagination to juxtapose altering realities. For
example, say I had a first order desire to study and another first order desire to play video
games. The only way I can form second order volitions through my own accords, rather
than through telekinesis from some hive queen, is to imagine a reality in which I study,
imagine a different reality in which I play video games, juxtapose the two realities, and
use reason to determine which reality is best for me. Due to their abilities for imaginative
play, we know that dogs, chimpanzees, and dolphins have, at the very least, basic
capacities for imagination. We also know that these animals have capacities for reason.
The remaining question is whether dogs, chimpanzees, and dolphins have the
ability to juxtapose these realities in their imaginations in order to compare the pros and
cons of their first order desires. According to Andrey Vyshedskiy, a professor at Boston
University, the ability to juxtapose is dependent on a form of constructive imagination
called Prefrontal Synthesis. Prefrontal Synthesis is primarily used to create novel mental
images out of independent objects. The images must be novel. If I read the phrase “dog
jumping” and have already seen a dog jumping, then my imagining a dog jumping does
not count as Prefrontal Synthesis. However, if someone describes a floating pink castle in
the sky, and I have never seen a floating pink castle in the sky, then my imagining such a
scene is Prefrontal Synthesis (Vyshedskiy 2019).
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According to Vyshedskiy, Prefrontal Synthesis is also essential for understanding
recursive language structures. Vyshedskiy describes recursive language as follows.
“Consider the two sentences: ‘A dog bit my friend’ and ‘My friend bit a dog.’ It is
impossible to distinguish the difference in meaning using words or grammar alone, since
both words and grammatical structure are identical in these two sentences. Understanding
the difference in meaning and appreciating the misfortune of the 1st sentence and the
humor of the 2nd sentence depends on interlocutor’s PFS ability (Vyshedkiy 2019, 6).
If an organism is capable of Prefrontal Synthesis, they will be able to understand
recursive language. If an organism is able to understand recursive language, they will be
able to understand the differences in meaning when the order of words is exchanged.
Many animals have been able to learn basic language. Dogs are able to understand
commands given to them by humans, and gorillas like Koko have been taught basic sign
language. However, understanding basic language is far easier than understanding
recursive sentences. Dolphins have been shown to understand tail recursion, which is the
ability to understand conjoined sentences. An example of a conjoined sentence is adding
the words “Mary told me” to the words “throw the ball” to create the sentence “Mary told
me to throw the ball” (Gregg 2013). However, this ability is different from the type of
recursion that requires Prefrontal Synthesis. According to evolutionary biologists William
Tecumseh Fitch, evolutionary biologist Mar D. Hauser, and linguist Noam Chomsky, no
non-human animal has shown an ability for recursive language. In a joint paper, they
claim that “despite decades of search, no animal communication system known shows
evidence of such recursion, and nor do studies of trained apes, dolphins and parrots”
(Fitch, Hauser, and Chomsky 2005, 203). This means that no animal other than humans,
that we know of, is capable of juxtaposition and hence no animal, other than humans, is
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capable of second order volitions. This implies that dogs, chimpanzees, dolphins, and
every other non-human animal, including Koko, are non-persons.
This is a promising result as it abides by our intuitions and gives weightage to our
intuitions. It has been a common belief throughout history that humans are the sole
persons on earth. However, it is not clear why this was the case. Now we know it is due
to our superior imaginative capabilities which give us the power for second order
volitions. But what about murkier edge cases such as advanced aliens, robots, artificial
intelligence, fetuses, children, and disabled humans?
It is entirely possible for aliens to have the full list of innate abilities to the degree
necessary to be persons. In addition, while we are not currently at this level of
technological advancement, it is entirely possible for robots and artificial intelligence to
be persons as well. The only abilities that are questionable, when looking to the future,
are the ability for sense and the ability for self-awareness. Seeing as senses need not be
biological and could be senses from robotic sensors or data inputs from code, it is
possible for robots and artificial intelligence to have the ability to sense. Additionally, it
is possible that in the future artificial intelligence and robots become self-aware.
Therefore, it is possible for robots and artificial intelligence to be metaphysical persons.
On the other hand, the statuses of fetuses and young children are complicated. It is
unclear exactly what Nussbaum means by innate abilities. We know that fetuses and
young children will eventually develop into creatures that can exhibit the required
abilities to the degree necessary for personhood. However, for a period of time, these
abilities are underdeveloped. Fetuses and new born babies do not have the ability for
reason or imagination necessary for second order volitions. However, as they age, these
abilities will develop to the point that they do. Does innate ability refer to the potential
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for an ability in its future state? Or does innate ability refer only to the degree of an
ability in its present state? If the case is the former, then fetuses and babies are
metaphysical persons. If the case is the latter, then fetuses and newborn babies are not
metaphysical persons but will one day become metaphysical persons.
I personally lean towards the latter. If we refer to innate abilities as the abilities
potential over time we run into some interesting problems. Modern artificial intelligence
could then be considered persons. As of right now artificial intelligence is not advanced
enough to be persons but one day it likely will be. In the future, virtual assistants like Siri
or Alexa might be complex enough to possess the seven abilities to the degree necessary
to be persons. This would mean that these virtual assistants are metaphysical persons
today. While I lean against this line of reasoning, to make a more definitive conclusion,
we would have to ask Nussbaum to further clarify innate abilities and their role in
dignity. However, it is important to note that even if fetuses and new born babies/young
children are not metaphysical persons, they may still be moral persons. Should this be the
case, they would still be deserving of moral protections.
Finally, our last “edge” case is disabled humans. Once again, the answer is not
clear cut. In short, it depends on the disability. If the disability has no effect on its
subject’s innate abilities, then the disabled human is still a metaphysical person. For
example, say a human were in a coma but suffered from no other limitations other than
being in a state of deep sleep. This human still has the innate abilities for self-awareness,
sense, imagination, thought, reason, emotion, and empathy. These abilities are just
restricted. This human still has the potential for the capabilities required for personhood,
but these capabilities are limited due to the human’s coma. In this example, the disabled
human is a metaphysical person. However, this human’s status and human dignities are
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being violated by the coma. On the other hand, take the example of a human who has
been in a horrible car crash and is completely brain dead. This human no longer has all,
or possibly any, of the innate abilities needed for personhood. Therefore, this human is no
longer a metaphysical person.
This claim may seem controversial and to some extent it is but once again it is
important to remember that metaphysical personhood and moral personhood are unique
concepts. Even if a disabled human is not a metaphysical person, they might still be
moral persons. And even if an entity is not a metaphysical or moral person, they still have
some level of dignity and therefore still deserve moral and metaphysical respect.
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Conclusion
The Capabilities Approach to Metaphysical Personhood defines a metaphysical
person as an entity that has seven innate abilities: self-awareness, sense, imagination,
thought, reason, emotion, and empathy. These abilities must exist to the degree necessary
to have status dignity. This new account of personhood tests positively, successfully
classifying our base cases of insects and humans as non-persons and persons respectively.
Additionally, this new account of personhood solves the issues plaguing Kant, Locke,
and Frankfurt, making it a strong candidate to replace these older, more popular accounts.
In my opinion, the most interesting realization stemming from this thesis is that
humans are the only species of persons, that we know of, on planet earth. This is due to
the fact that no other animal has the imaginative capacity to develop second order
volitions. This is fascinating as it gives weight to a human intuition that has existed for
centuries: that we are unique and special in some way. Now we know this uniqueness
comes from our advanced imagination, which allows us to not only form second order
volitions but also process complex language and problem solve creatively.
This account of metaphysical personhood does arrive at some controversial
conclusions. If we accept this notion of personhood, then it is likely that fetuses, new
born babies, very young children, and severely disabled humans are not metaphysical
persons. To be certain of these conclusions, we would have to explore the idea of innate
abilities more thoroughly, however this is a task for a future paper or another philosopher.
However, regardless of the outcome, we must remember that moral persons need not be
metaphysical persons. Regardless of an entity’s metaphysical status, we might still owe
them moral considerations.
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